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Abstract
The City of Prineville Railway provides an excellent case study of
the long-period experience with a small railroad—a type of railroad
that has been of increasing interest in recent years, particularly
those created to take over lines abandoned by major railroad systems.
This paper brings up to date previous studies of the line. After
early years of losses, the railroad was profitable for a number of
years, but decline in lumber production due to the recession and
increased truck competition, itself increased by the recession, have
reduced the volumes of traffic considerably. The experience of the
line in the last two years, of connecting main lines cancelling joint
rates and eliminating parity for shippers on the line, is matched in
many parts of the country.
The relationship with the city government, which owns the
railroad, is examined in some detail. The city came to depend heavily
upon the earnings of the line as a source of financing city expen-
ditures. One consequence was the draining of funds that should have
been used for track maintenance; another has been the serious problem
created for the city as railway earnings have vanished with the
decline in traffic. It is difficult to get voters to approve tax
increases to offset the decline in railway profits.
The railway's experience in "leasing" a large number of freight
cars from the car leasing firms as a source of revenue backfired, as
it did for many small railroads, as car shortages changed to car
surplusses.
Despite problems, however, the railroad is continuing to provide a
highly essential service to the shippers of the community—the lumber
and mills and molding plants, and the major inbound user—a large
wholesale tire firm. Recently the railroad has developed piggyback
traffic.
Over the 64 years of the operation of the railroad, the experience
has shown that a city can operate a railroad effectively, and that the
original investment by the city was justified by the earnings and the
effect on community development. The raiLroad still has far more than
adequate traffic for survival, but downward adjustments in staff and
costs are always painful.
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The abandonment of extensive mileage of the Penn Central and other
eastern railroads, of the Rock. Island, and major portions of the
Milwaukee and planned abandonments of light traffic lines of other
roads, such as the Burlington Northern, have led to the formation of a
number of small local railroad companies that have taken over aban-
doned lines of major systems. This trend has increased interest in
the operation of small railroads generally, which has resulted, for
example, in the recent publication by the Association of American
Railroads of a volume entitled Small Railroads (Washington, 1982).
This paper surveys the experience of a relatively small railroad—the
18 mile City of Prineville Railway (C of P)—updating previous work in
1965-68 and in 1973. The experience of the C of P offers significant
conclusions for small railroads generally and municipally operated
lines in particular.
*The author is greatly indebted to a number of persons who assisted
in the preparation of this paper, including Mrs. Frances Juris Rush,
the retired city Recorder-Treasurer of Prineville; the members of the
Shippers Advisory Board of the City of Prineville Railway; the Manager
of the railroad, Mr. B. J. Wiggs, and other railway employees; the
City Administrator, Mr. Henry Hartley, and others.
J. F. Due, "The City of Prineville Railway—A Case Study in Gov-
ernment Enterprise," Quarterly Review of Economics and Business , Vol.
5 (Winter 1965), pp. 63-82; J. F. Due and Frances Juris, Rails to the
Ochoco Country: The City of Prineville Railway , San Marino, Calif.:
Golden West Books, 1968; and J. F. Due, Municipal Operation of Railway
Lines , University of Illinois, College of Commerce Faculty Working
Paper, 1974, pp. 15-50.
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The City and the Railway
Central Oregon—the area directly to the east of the Cascades and
extending from the escarpment south of Wasco County toward the
California border, was settled relatively late because of difficult
terrain, limited transport, and relatively low rainfall; it could not
compete with the lush Willamette Valley for settlers in the early
years. Settlement began in the 1860s
—
primarily cattlemen and sheepmen.
Even by 1910 the area was very thinly settled, as much of it still is.
Prineville, first settled in 1869, grew slowly, but it became the com-
mercial center of a vast area between the Cascades and the Burns—John
Day country, and from Cow Canyon to the area tributary to Lakeview and
Klamath Falls. When railroads were built into Central Oregon from the
Columbia River, the lines (a single line south of Metolius) missed
Prineville by 18 miles for reasons of geography. Bend, the terminous,
became the major industrial and commercial center within a short time.
After efforts to get private enterprise to build a line from Prineville
to the main line, the city built the railroad in 1917-18 in an effort
to protect the economy of the city and to encourage the development of
lumber mills. The city has operated the line continuously since that
time, as a unit of the city government. Prineville had a population
of only 1,100 when it built the line; today it has 5,260 (1982).
The Line
—
The 18 mile line extends from the yards on the north
edge of the city 18 miles westward to Prineville Jet., where it con-
nects with both the Union Pacific and the Burlington Northern, on a
track owned by the latter but jointly used. The line parallels
The BN line extends from Wishram, on the Portland-Spokane route,
through Bend and Klamath Falls to a connection with the Western Pacific
at Bieber, California. The UP operates only from The Dalles to Bend.
ot
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Lamonta road out of town, follows the Crooked River most of the way,
and climbs on a 2 1/2 percent grade to the plateau on which is located
the main line. There are no intermediate stations or sidings that are
used. There are seven lumber-industry shippers located on the line,
plus a produce warehouse and a grain and feed mill. Several other
firms have direct access but do not normally use the line. The road
has two long spur lines, one about a mile long, eastward from the
yards along the edge of the city to the Ochoco Lumber Co. on the east
edge of town, the other up a steep grade to reach the Hudspeth Mill
and American Forest Products on the hill to the east of the city. The
office and shops are located in Prineville.
fbtive Power and Operation
The road has for the last 13 years had the same motive power
—
three ALCO 660 hp. 199,000 lb. 6 cylinder diesels. These are of course
very small by present day standards. The first was purchased new in
May of 1950, to replace 50 year old steam locomotives. A second was
acquired second hand from the Spokane Portland and Seattle in 1961
(it has been built in 1941) and a third from the Oregon and Northwestern
in 1969. They can be operated in multiple, and usually two are used
for both switching and line operation, except when loads are very
light. All three were completely rebuilt by Morrison Knudsen in the
early seventies. Over the years these diesels served the road very
well, at very low capital cost. But they are now old by any standards,
41 years being well beyond the normal life. All are suffering from
various forms of metal fatigue and are limited to about 800 tons up
the grade to the junction. The railroad would like to have two 2000
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hp. diesels to replace Che three, but acquisition is not being con-
sidered in the immediate future. The railroad does have reserve funds
that could be used for the purpose. A standard caboose is used.
In the earlier years of dieselization, after two diesels were
acquired, two trains were run 5 times a week, one in the daytime, one
at night. Later the road shifted to once a day operation, 5 days a
week. But as traffic increased, the two diesels could not longer take
the train up the grade. Accordingly, the line returned to two trains
a day. This continued until traffic fell off in the late seventies,
when operation fell to one train a day, and finally to one train three
times a week in 1979. The switching is done in the late afternoon.
The run to the junction begins about 8 p.m., and the train returns
anywhere from 10 to midnight or later, with the inbound cars dis-
tributed that night. Overtime often is necessary. Five to ten loaded
cars is typical—by contrast to the 20 cars on each train of a decade
ago. Originally each of the major roads had regular service through
Prineville Jet. daily. Now their service has become somewhat irregu-
lar, typically three times a week (apart from BN through freights,
which do not normally switch at the junction).
Traffic Patterns: Non-lumber Traffic
The railroad is and has been for several decades primarily a lumber
carrier. But it was not in its early days, and unlike some of its
Oregon neighbors, still has substantial non-lumber revenue. Table 1
provides data of total traffic by class of commodity from 1950 through
1981, with the 1920 data for purposes of comparison, and Table 2, ton
miles.
TABLE 1
Cara Handled, by Type of Traffic, City of Prineville Railway
1920; 1950-1981
Lumber
by produces
Pota-
toes
Live-
stock
Petroleum
Products
Ferti-
lizers
Ce-
ment
Company
Mdae.
Miscel-
laneous Total
1920
outbound
Inbound 37
19 SO 7.936
1951 8,454
19 52 7,446
1953 7,543
19 54 7,954
1955 8,116
1956 6,633 18
1957 5,700 180
19 58 6,073 796
1959 6,049 1,025
1960 4,545 930
1961 4,766 988
1962 4,913 1.016
1963 5,366 1,054
1964 5,045 1,005
1965 5,539 924
1966 5,364 1,361
1967 5,421 1,273
1968 6,375 2,240
1969 5,848 2,444
1970 6,024 3,012
1971 6,647 2,983
1972 6,639 2,389
1973 6,957 2.547
418 10
10
469 134 24
416 182 14
292 61 11
206 43 12
228 57 14
253 147 10
153 26 3
184 29 1
135 81
54 7 3
100 5
91 5
165
243 1
193
140
241
217
214
n
323
242
100
62
53
36
415
406
402
438
488
403
326
347
388
385
373
320
328
310
258
284
303
283
373
294
235
228
154
113
15
22
86 21
450)
205)
6
1
6
2
5
5
8
9
14
8
12
17
28
14
14
17
4
9
9
2
2
2
4
50
38
28
15
13
11
9
8
9
29
91
56
31
41
54
84
65
59
42
42
35
52
5
62
111
121
28
30
27
18
20
21
25
4
11
11
11
15
16
16
17
9
18
12
20
25
4
2
4
213
127
107
101
101
124
112
124
83
86
140
52
56
53
33
51
78
101
60
48
61
38
191
29
44
42
128
70
41
53
64
48
12
34
22
21
16
9
9
9,310
9,741
8,416
8,460
8,975
9,176
7,377
6,645
7,626
7,685
6,152
6,429
6,586
7.112
6,618
7,025
7,430
7,354
9,275
9,013
9,682
10,076
9,559
9.477
Logs Food Paper
Machin-
ery a Chem-
Matala lcals
1974 5.699 2,259 na 28 12 13
1975 4,813 2,342 as 18 9 12
1976 5,108 2,412 na 10 16 18
19 77 4,788 2.352 na 14 6 14
1978 4,644 1,729 35 2 a 1
1979 4.100 1,685 59 5 4
1980 3,105 1,722 na
6
10
5
9
11
6
4
1981 2,286 1,303 75
119
102
252
309
420
345
284
279*
3
5
4
4
5
11
23
109
12
6
4
275^
703
8.172
7,432
7,847
7,5051
6,8791
6,2171
5,413
4,033
In a column Indicated In subsequent years.
na - aoc aeparacely stated.
1. Omitting enpty cara raporcad In source documental 30 in 1977, 32 In 1978; 15 In 1979. These are apeclal aoveaenCa
of empdea. noc ordinary return of empty cars.
2. 273 coacalners returned empcy.
3. 69 concalnera returned empcy.
4. 29 of these, TOPC. Soma shipments In Che new categories shown from 1974 po were Included in other categories prior
Co ChaC year.
Clcy of PrlnevllLa Railway, Summary of Carloads and Tonnaffe. annual, and Cara Handled by Type of Traffic
.
1981. Oaca from Che Cwo aourcea are noc enclrely conalatenc, but Che dlfferencea are minor. ToCala are
taken from che flrac source.
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TABLE 2
Traffic Volume by Year
City of Prineville Railroad
1919-1981
Ton
Miles Revenue
Year (000's) Passengers
1919 204 8804
1920 245 15213
1921 175 9248
1922 180 9319
1923 250 7796
1924 225 2152
1925 207 2173
1926 235 1197
1927 257 556
1928 231 562
1929
. 231 464
1930 171 165
1931 164 152
1932 152 36
1933 114 650
1934 159 147
1935 143 33
1936 275 17
1937 380 52
1938 699 45
1939 1718 6
1940 2042
1941 2563
1942 3041
1943 2476
1944 2777
1945 2444
1946 2557
1947 3247
1948 3529
1949 3723
1950 4847
1951 5014
1952 4446
1953 4363
1954 4704
Ton
Miles
Year (000's)
1955 4730
1956 3902
1957 3646
1958 4246
1959 4328
1960 3493
1961 3657
1962 4252
1963 4661
1964 4403
1965 4719
1966 5056
1967 5112
1968 6600
1969 6476
1970 7199
1971 7488
1972 7057
1973 7784
1974 6975
1975 6656
1976 7003
1977 6425
1978 5635
1979 5407
1980 5006
1981 3884
Source: City of Prineville Railway, Annual Summary of Carloads and
Tonnage; I.C.C. Statistics of Railways ,
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In early years, the farm product traffic was dominant. In 1920,
for example, livestock constituted over 90 percent of the outbound
traffic and two-thirds of the total traffic. Much of the livestock
traffic had shifted to trucks before 1950 and virtually all by 1958.
Potato traffic became of major importance in the early fifties, with
little trend from 1952 to 1970, and then vanished to trucks. Incoming
traffic in feed and fertilizer likewise disappeared in the sixties and
early seventies.
The incoming manufactured goods traffic has largely disappeared,
with the exception of tires, as noted below. The cement traffic was
lost to trucks in the fifties; that in automobiles in 1961 with the
change in the methods of shipping them, which necessitated unloading
facilities not available in Prineville, and in petroleum products,
once a significant source of revenue. Gasoline for the two major dis-
tributors, Standard of California and Union, remained on rail until
the early seventies (much longer than in most parts of the country)
and then was transferred to truck. The petroleum traffic since then
has been nominal. In general, Prineville is not large enough for
manufactured goods traffic to move in in carload quantities.
The one exception is the traffic in automobile tires and related
products. This is one of Prineville' s two greatest business success
stories of the last decade. Les Schwab, who ran a small tire shop,
entered the wholesale tire business in 1970. In that year, the rail-
road brought in 29 cars of tires. At the present time, Schwab has 130
retail tire stores throughout the northwest, employing 180 persons in
Prineville alone. The firm is reported to be the largest tire whole-
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saler in the northwest, handling a wide range of brands of tires. The
firm supplies all its retail stores from Prineville (some distribution
previously done in Seattle is being transferred to Prineville). Most
tires come in by rail, including some piggyback, from various suppliers
in the midwest and east (Memphis is the most important source) and are
distributed to the stores on a weekly basis in the firm's own trucks.
The only exception to the rail movement is the trucking of some im-
ported tires (Japan) from the ports of Portland and Los Angeles. The
traffic reached a peak of 420 cars in 1978; the figure for 1981 was
279 cars. The traffic is expected to increase. The firm finds rail
to be substantially cheaper than truck and is one of the railroad's
strongest supporters. When the firm started out on a small scale basis,
it made one bad mistake—it did not locate its plant on the railroad
line, and thus must truck from the station area. The rail traffic
yielded in 1981 $392 per car, compared to $216 per car on nontransit
lumber.
The Lumber Industry and Lumber Traffic
Lumber traffic, nonexistent in 1920 (the mills were not established
until the 1930s) peaked in the early fifites, fell almost in half by
1960 (mostly because fewer logs were available)
,
peaked again but below
the earlier figures in 1971, and then has fallen sharply, for reasons
discussed below. Wood chip traffic began in 1956-57 (the chips had
previously been burned), rose steadily till 1970 (when there was ex-
actly one car of chips for every two cars of lumber) and then has de-
clined as lumber production has fallen. While traffic in logs (much
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of it now from central Washington) is small in magnitude, it has been
increasing, because of a shortage of logs in the Prineville area. Much
of the decline in lumber traffic is of course temporary, a reflection
of the effect of high interest rates and recession upon the demand for
lumber.
The Industry—The basic element of the economy of Prineville is
lumber. While sawmills operated on a small scale basis for local con-
sumption from the 1880s on, commercial production on a significant
scale began only in 1935. Production expanded rapidly after World War
II and then leveled off. The lumber industry contains essentially two
elements: sawmills—the production of lumber—and remanufacture—the
production of millwork. These may be combined in the same firm, or
carried on by separate firms.
There are five sawmills:
Pine Products, the original mill established in 1935, with
a standard sawmill and a new (1980) highly automated
mill for small logs.
Ochoco Lumber Co., started in 1938, largely locally owned
with some outside investors; Ochoco is the only mill
to own substantial timber land of its own.
Hudspeth Sawmill Co., established in 1947, family owned.
The firm also has operated a mill in John Day, now
closed.
Louisiana-Pacific, the only sawmill operated by a large
outside company. The firm purchased the property
of the local Prineville Forest Products Co. in 1973;
the local firm had closed after four years of oper-
ation.
Consolidated Pine, established in 1952, the only sawmill
that also operates a millwork plant. The firm is
owned by outside investors.
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There are two exclusively millwork or remanufacture plants:
Clear Pine Mouldings, a subsidiary of Contact Lumber Co.
of Portland, established in 1941.
American Forest Products Co., one of the largest millwork
plants in the northwest, with operations in California
as well. This was once a subsidiary of Bendix, but
was later sold to private investors.
The development of this operation was another success
story in Prineville. It was started by Leonard Wilkinson
in 1959 as COIN Millwork and expanded in a decade to a
major operation reportedly the largest employer in
central Oregon. Wilkinson sold to AFP in 1977, retired,
and died shortly thereafter.
In addition, D & E Wood Products produces various specialty prod-
ucts.
Thus some lumber is shipped out in rough or planed form, but a
substantial portion of the local output goes to the millwork plants,
which in turn also bring in lumber from the outside, mainly from
Klamath Falls and northern California. The local mills cannot provide
adequate lumber of the right types for the milling operations.
This inbound lumber came in under milling in transit (MIT) rates,
by rail, and the millwork moved out by rail. The major railroads
nationally have been seeking to eliminate MIT rates (they regard the
short inbound haul as too costly), and while the rates still exist for
lumber, the added charges have made them much less attractive. AFP
still brings in considerable lumber under MIT, but Clear Pine and
Consolidated are primarily having their lumber supply trucked, mostly
from Klamath Falls.
It has long been felt that the C of P did not receive adequate
compensation for the transit traffic; C of P receives nothing on the
outbound lumber, but instead the UP and BN paid the salary of one
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clerk for the C of P, which did all the billing. The C of P did not
receive the transit charge.
The principal wood is Ponderosa pine, at least 70 percent and often
more of the output. This goes into a wide range of uses, but particu-
larly for windows, doors, panelling, and the like, in contrast to fir,
the other principal Northwest lumber, that is used for sheeting, rafters,
studs, and similar type. While the lumber, per se , has experienced
increased difficulty in competing in the Midwest and Eastern market
with Southern and Canadian producers , the higher quality Ponderosa pine
is able to compete as millwork even in the South. There is some
production of fir and larch in the Prineville mills, but it is less
profitable.
From the late thirties up through the mid seventies the Prineville
mills in general did well, with remanufacturing becoming of increasing
importance. The mills depended heavily upon Forest Service timber,
and there was barely enough timber for them to operate to full scale
—
but they operated profitably. Then came trouble, when Louisiana
Pacific (L-P) bought the small mill of Prineville Forest Products, ex-
panded it, and started bidding. The result was to drive up timber
prices. Since there were not enough logs for five mills, L-P commenced
to bid in the Deschutes National Forest against Brooks-Scanlon (B-S),
with plants in Bend and Redmond, which heretofore had avoided competi-
tion with the Prineville mills in the Ochoco National Forest. But
after L-P won several biddings, B-S retaliated by bidding in Ochoco
and winning. The result was to drive prices up drastically—to two
-12-
times or more the minimum set by the Forest Service—in 1977 and 1978.
Ultimately B-S was purchased by Diamond International, which shows less
interest in carrying on cutthroat bidding. But the Ochoco Forest simply
cannot support five mills, and bringing in logs from Washington state, as
is being done to some extent, is costly. Sooner or later one mill must go.
As of mid-1981 there is no problem of cutthroat bidding; the mills
have contracts on which they are obtaining delays in cutting. All
have been operating well below annual capacity. As of raid-June 1982,
only Ochoco, with its own timber and private purchases, computerized
log scanning, and strong marketing department, was operating near full
scale. Hudspeth had been closed down for over a year. L-P reopened
in July 1982 after being closed for eight months. Consolidated and
Pine Products closed in June, but reopened in July. The result is
substantial loss in employment (the county has a 24% unemployment
rate), and in traffic for the railway.
With normal operation, the mills provide about 2000 jobs. Figures
reported in 1977 and 1978 indicate that AFP had 585 employees; Ochoco
around 120, Hudspeth 225, Clear Pine 250 (405 at the peak), Consolidated
140. The lumber mills are "medium" sized mills by usual classification;
while economies of scale are not as important in lumber production as
in some other fields, they are of some influence. The local mills,
therefore, concentrate on specialty products and mixed shipments
rather than direct competition in, for example, 2 by 4s
.
The battle for logs was described in feature articles in the
Prineville Central Oregonian
,
September 27, 1977 and May 3, 1979. For
example, in September 1978, the price of pine reached $280 per thousand;
the successful bid was $3.5 million compared to the Forest Service
$2 million minimum.
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The current problems of the Industry are of course a result of the
recession and high interest rates, that have drastically curtailed con-
struction, and lowered lumber prices relative to costs. Obviously
with recovery and lower interest rates the industry will revive. Some
experts believe that it will not recover to earlier levels; others be-
lieve that there will be a temporary boom as a result of catching up
with the construction deferred by the recession. The longer range
question for Prineville is more difficult; there will be a continuing
steady supply of logs, but it is very unlikely that five sawmills can
be supported.
The Railroad's Lumber Traffic. General revival of the lumber in-
dustry will of course increase the railroad's lumber traffic to some
extent. The serious problem, however, from the railroad's standpoint
is the extent to which traffic lost to trucks can be regained, or
whether the loss trend will continue. The lumber and millwork traf-
fic from the Prineville area remained almost totally immune to truck
competition for a very long period; as late as 1973, there was only a
nominal amount of trucking of inbound shop lumber or outbound products,
except some millwork to the west coast, and an occasional back haul.
There began in the mid seventies a steady shifting of traffic from
rail to truck; one of the first public statements appeared in the
Central Qregonian 's feature section, Heritage '77 , October 1977,
quoting Ed Wilson, Ochoco's marketing chief, who pointed out the trend
and the potential hazard for the railroad.
It is not possible to obtain a precise current figure. But ap-
parently not over 40 percent of the lumber is moving out by rail (one
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mill reports 45%, another 40%, another 12%). Of the raillwork, the
rail percentage is much higher—one reporting all rail until some re-
cent experimental loads to the east, one only 8% truck, another 60%
rail. The shift has occurred primarily in the last five years.
There are several reasons for the trend, various shippers stress-
ing different reasons:
1. The tendency of customers to purchase in smaller quantities,
because of reduced sales, high interest rates, and, for
several years increases in lumber prices greater than those
of the price level. A typical truck load is no more than
half the usual rail car minimum load.
2. Difference in delivery time, particularly important in a
period in which lumber prices have been changing rapidly.
Examples given by shippers include Chicago: 3 days vs. 10;
to the east, 4 days instead of 2 weeks.
3. Lessening of the differential between rail and truck rates.
While the differential was 50% or more a decade ago, it is
now typically no more (to the midwest) than 10 to 30 percent.
Many buyers are willing to pay the higher rate because of
the time saving. The differential has lessened because of
the higher weight and length limits and the rise of the
owner-operator, willing to work for much less than the union
In the Central Oregonian of February 14, 1980, two mills indicated
the following percentage by rail: Ochoco, 60%; Hudspeth, 80% including
subsequent millwork traffic.
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truck driver. Railroad wages have escalated more than gen-
eral wage levels in the economy. Truck lines are also more
free than they were to quote lower rates because of deregula-
tion, and frequently, low back haul rates—often lower than
rail rates—are available.
4. Loss of rail sidings by customers as a result of abandonment
of lines in the east and midwest.
5. Shift of markets; a higher percentage of Prineville lumber
and millwork is going to the west coast, and thus trucking is
relatively more advantageous. Particularly for lumber, it is
increasingly difficult for northwest mills to compete with
southern and Canadian mills.
In addition, trucks have the continuing advantage of less damage;
millwork suffers damage from shifting of loads in freight cars. As
noted below, some additional loss occurred during a period of shortage
of boxcars.
Some of the loss may have been temporary, because of the effect of
high interest rates and the recession in leading customers to request
small shipments. Beyond this, it is very difficult to predict whether
the trend will reverse or continue. There are several potential in-
fluences:
R. G. Harris and T. E. Keeler, Determinants of Railroad Profit-
ability . University of California Transportation Policy Research
Center, Working Paper SL-8000, 1980, p. 3.
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1. The attitude of the major roads serving the northwest toward
preserving the lumber traffic. Some shippers feel that the
UP and the BN are placing so much stress on coal and grain
that they are ignoring lumber. They allowed the fresh fruit
and vegetable traffic to slip away, and only recently, follow-
ing deregulation, began a concerted effort to win some back.
The C of P has little influence on their policies. Clearly,
lumber rates exceed out of pocket costs; the railroads have
substantial leeway under deregulation to lower their rates to
protect the traffic.
There is little opportunity for Prineville mills to take
advantage of multi-car or contract rates, as the shipments go
to diverse locations.
2. Relative trends in costs. A sharp rise in energy costs would
aid the railroads, as they are far more fuel efficient (when
traffic volume is high) than trucks.
Relative wage trends are also significant. As noted, in
recent years, wages in the industry have risen faster than
wage levels generally, and this year much faster than truck
wages. In addition, railroad labor costs are artificially
inflated above real economic costs by obsolete features of
union contracts. Adjustments are being slowly made; if the
railroads can speed up the process of contract adjustments and
constrain wage increases to national patterns, their relative
position will improve.
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Potential Loss of the Chip Traffic. The traffic in wood chips,
going to Longview, Washington, has become an important source of rail
revenue, yielding in 1981, 37 percent of the railroad's gross operating
revenue. Some of this traffic has been lost because Clear Pine Mould-
ings grinds its chips to sawdust and trucks to a plant in Bend. Other-
wise, the traffic has remained on rail thus far. But the Longview
Fibre Co., to which the chips go, has built a chip loading dock in The
Dalles and is encouraging the use of a truck-barge combination. So
far the rates are not competitive—but the policy constitutes a threat
to the rail traffic.
1
Attitudes of the Shippers Toward the Railway
Despite the transfer of considerable traffic to trucks, the shippers
in general regard continuation of the railroad as essential to the
lumber industry
—
particularly the moulding plants. Most of the shippers
indicate preference for shipment by rail, in part to support the rail-
road, and indicate preference for being able to return to primary use
of rail when conditions permit. There are exceptions and one or two
are pessimistic about the future of the railroad. But on the whole
there is strong shipper support and conviction of the importance of
continued operation of the railroad for their activity and for the
community. There is also widespread attitude that the present rail-
road manager is highly cooperative with the shippers and has encouraged
This was expressed very clearly in statements in the Central
Oregonian, February 14, 1980.
-In-
efficient operation. But there is some belief that the railroad has
lacked a top level rate person, able to deal effectively with the major
carriers.
Rates and Rate Problems
The key rates to the railroad are the outgoing rates on lumber and
millwork. Until very recently, Prineville mills had parity with those
of other central Oregon points, as the rates were the same for all of
them to midwest and eastern destinations. With the Staggers Act, how-
ever, the railroads have much greater freedom to alter rates without
commission action, and as a result the BN, and to a lesser degree the
UP, have commenced to issue some new rates from Prineville Junction
rather than from Prineville. This will result in a combination rate
from Prineville, thus higher than the rates from Bend and Redmond.
The C of P will have to offer a relatively low rate, less than its
share of the through rate, to hold the traffic; otherwise there is in-
creased danger of trucking of the lumber, and possible movement of the
mills to main line points. The existing rate divisions, while not out-
standing from the point of view of the C of P, have generally been re-
garded as adequate. This tendency to eliminate joint rates is nation-
wide, particularly on the part of Conrail. The major roads believe
that the share received by the small roads has often been excessive,
even though the latter do the switching and typically the billing and
interline settlement, and thus are entitled to a much larger share than
one proportional to mileage. The greatest harm has been suffered by
smaller roads that participate in overhead or bridge traffic between
-19-
two major carriers, such as the Green Bay and Western, but others are
suffering as well. The ICC does retain jurisdiction, but has been re-
luctant to exercise it, as witnessed by the Conrail grain rate case,
in which the elimination of joint rates has threatened to put two rail-
roads in the New York City area out of business. There are a large
number of similar cases pending before the ICC currently, and some de-
cisions are likely to go to the Supreme Court.
There is little the C of P can do about this, except to present as
strong a case as possible to the BN and the UP to continue parity.
The shippers, particularly where they have mills on other lines as
well, may be able to be more persuasive than the C of P.
By contrast, the BN, but not thus far the UP, has been cooperative
in establishing joint piggyback rates, with a reasonable share for the
C of P.
Earnings and Expenses
Tables 3a and 3b show the revenues, expenses, and other profit and
loss statement items from 1919 down to the present time. Early profits
gave way to 15 years of losses, 1924-1938, made up by the city. Except
for 1945, when heavy maintenance expenses (treated as current expenses)
caused a loss, 1938 was the last year of losses until an estimated loss
figure for 1981. In the 1951-59 period, net earnings from railroad
operations averaged $136,000 per year, a 20% return on investment; from
1960 to 1967, $91,000, or 12% (lumber production was down in this
period), and 1968-1975, $173,000 or 16% return. The decline started
after 1973, and particularly from 1977 on, as traffic fell. This, as
noted, encouraged the experiment with car leasing, which for two years
-20-
TABLE 3a
Revenues, Expenditures, and Net Earnings
City of Prineville Railway
1919-1960
($000s)
Operating Operating Net Railway
Year Revenues Expenses Operating Income
1919 34 23 10
1920 49 37 12
1921 36 34 2
1922 38 37 2
1923 41 35 6
1924 33 42 - 9
1925 30 42 - 12
1926 30 35 - 7
1927 27 28 - 1
1928 28 30 - 2
1929 32 31
1930 21 27 - 6
1931 19 24 - 5
1932 16 21 - 5
1933 14 19 - 5
1934 14 19 - 5
1935 15 22 - 7
1936 18 21 - 3
1937 26 40 - 15
1938 41 48 - 11
1939 78 67 6
1940 105 70 27
1941 129 65 56
1942 148 84 53
1943 122 89 24
1944 141 112 17
1945 103 168 - 80
1946 152 136 9
1947 191 170 5
1948 270 204 47
1949 334 227 81
1950 393 286 85
1951 417 257 142
1952 374 222 136
1953 371 214 138
1954 406 241 146
1955 406 244 141
1956 357 248 85
1957 346 192 126
1958 395 198 165
1959 390 214 149
1960 306 192 80
Source: I.C.C. Statistics of Railwavs volumes.
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and in part in a third resulted in holding net earnings up to earlier
levels—though the earnings from rail operation, per se, continued to
fall, with a deficit in 1981 (and undoubtedly in 1982 as well). Now,
of course, the leasing contribution is small. The figures in recent
years are in part estimates, since the Federal rehabilitation grants
are included in the revenues and the rehabilitation expenditures in
the expense figures. These have been removed from the figures in the
tables so far as possible, but the resulting figures do involve some
estimation. It is obvious, in any event, that the railroad is barely
breaking even and is probably showing some deficit from operations.'
Over the years the railroad built up a substantial reserve; it is
impossible to obtain the exact figure, but judging from the interest
earned, it is between $800,000 and $1 million. The earnings on this
sum are of course important to the railroad, and the sura itself can
be used if necessary to complete urgent rehabilitation and ultimately
to replace the diesels.
Thus the railroad, over most of its life, has earned a respectable
figure upon the capital investment. The current problem is the re-
sult of the traffic decline, as noted, caused by the recession and high
interest rates and consequent construction decline, and loss of traf-
fic to trucks. If present conditions were expected to continue, and
costs could not be reduced, the city would do well, on a strict dollars
and cents basis, simply to liquidate the railroad. But there are
several important considerations dictating against this course of
action. First, almost certainly construction and thus lumber traffic
will increase again. Secondly, it should be possible to reduce costs
-23-
drastically, if, as a result of trucking, traffic continues at low
levels. Management has reduced the number of employees from 23 in
1973 to 16 currently. Trains are operated only three times a week
instead of twice daily, as in the mid seventies. Further reductions
are clearly possible. The railroad originated or terminated 224 cars
per mile of line in 1981. For some years, the Interstate Commerce
Commission regard a figure of 34 cars per mile as the typical breaking
point at which operation could not be economically sustained. On this
basis, the railroad could be economically viable at 15% of the present
traffic but of course with drastic reduction in personnel. More ser-
iously, many railroads have survived indefinitely at no more than
100,000 ton miles per mile of line—whereas the Prineville line in
1981 has 215,777; in fact, many survive at 50,000 and even less. There
is no danger, therefore, of the need to abandon the line—but drastic
change in operation would become necessary if traffic stayed at much
lower levels than at present—lower wage levels, less specialization
of labor, and junction settlements. And there would be no possibility
of revenue for the city. For a profitable, frequent service railroad
yielding the city substantial revenue, 50 percent more traffic than
the present is necessary.
Secondly, as noted, shippers universally regard retention of the
line as imperative for operation of the mills and economic development
of the area. While trucking has made substantial inroads into the
traffic, rail service is imperative for much of the traffic, given
relative costs.
One estimate, by operators of small railroads in Indiana, is that
75 to 80 cars per mile is the minimum for profitable operation.
-24-
Table 4 shows the breakdown of expenses over the period from 1963,
in dollar terms and percentage wise. Percentages are not given for
1981 because of the distortion created by the rehabilitation expenses.
In general the percentages show remarkably little variation. Mainten-
ance of way expenditures averaged 24% of the total, with a range from
21 to 28 in the period prior to 1975, and then began to rise as the
road sought to catch up on deferred maintenance, reaching 42% in 1980.
Maintenance of equipment averaged 16%, with little tread; traffic be-
tween 1 and 2 percent. The major cost item is for transportation;
that is, train operation, about half of the total in peak years. The
average was 44% in 1963-68; 50%, 1969-75; and 43%, 1975-80, reaching
a low of 37 percent in 1978.
General administrative expenses averaged 10% over the period, show-
ing a slight downward trend to 1973 and upward since. Both taxes and
net rent for freight cars (not included in operating expenses) showed
a somewhat greater increase over the period than the total operating
expense figure. Car rentals are particularly sensitive to volume of
traffic. They rose rapidly over the period down to the late seventies
because of the sharp increase in per diem and incentive payments pre-
scribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
For a study of the responsiveness of light traffic railroad costs
to changes in the volume of traffic, see Alberta Charney, Nancy Sidhu
and J. F. Due, "Short Run Cost Functions for Class II Railroads,"
Logistics and Transportation Review
,
Vol. 13 (1977), pp. 345-59.
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Relationship with the City
The precise relationship of the railroad and the city has never
been clearly defined. The railroad is essentially an agency of the
city government, not a separate corporation, as is the Belfast and
Moosehead Lake Railroad in Maine, owned primarily by the city of
Belfast. For many years the railway fund was shown as a separate fund
in the annual city budget. Following a ruling of the Oregon Department
of Revenue that since the railroad is subject to the Interstate Com-
merce Commission budget control, the Oregon Local Budget Law is not
applicable, the railroad budget is no longer shown in the city budget,
and only the amount of the transfer from the railroad fund to the gen-
eral fund. The railroad is regarded as a entity distinct from the
city for purposes of the Railway Labor Act, the Interstate Commerce
Act, and the Railroad Retirement Act.
Nevertheless, the railroad is under the jurisdiction of the City
Council, which delegates general supervision to the three member Rail-
road Commission, made up of three members of the council. However,
the Commission and the Council do not attempt to intervene in the
operation of the railroad, but only in major policy issues. Super-
vision is left in the hands of the manager, who is appointed by the
City Council upon recommendation of the Commission. The general im-
pression is that the relationship between the city government and the
railroad is not as close as it was 15 years ago.
A Shippers Advisory Board, which has existed, at least on paper,
off and on over the years, has commenced to function actively during
the last year (1981-82). All of the major shippers are represented
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on the Board, which meets quarterly with the railway manager and the
mayor. All personnel matters are handled by the Manager.
Table 5 shows the financial relationships between the railroad and
the city. The city provided the funds through a bond issue to build
the railroad; the last of the bonds were paid off in 1963. The city
advanced about $66,000 to the railway in the period 1924-1938, pri-
marily to cover deficits. Since 1941, the city has received a total
of $3,273 million.
In the period from 1940 through 1981, the railroad earned, from
railway operation, $3,934,000. In addition, the railroad earned about
$700,000 in the form of other income, and an estimated $300,000 out
of the car leasing. Thus in total the railroad earned about $5 million,
of which the city received $3.3 million, $1.7 million being used for
improvements to the railway and added to reserves, which total between
$800,000 and $1 million.
For every year from 1950 to 1977, the railway contribution to the
city exceeded the city property tax levy. In the years 1964 through
1968, the revenue was sufficiently great to allow the city to avoid
any levy. From 1969 through 1976 the railway contribution was between
three and four times the property tax levy, and the property tax rate,
which averaged $1.28 per $1000 assessed valuation, was very low com-
pared to other cities in Oregon of comparable size; for example, in
1978, the rate in Bend was $4.34, in Redmond, $5.83, in Madras, $7.78.
In 1980, the average for Oregon cities between 5,000 and 10,000 popu-
lation was $4.56 compared to Prineville's $2.03. The contribution
figure was usually suggested by the railway and accepted by the city
—
Prinevllle Municipal Receipts trom the Railway and Property Taxes
1935-1983
Railway City Propercy City Property
Contribution Tax Levy Tax Rate
Year* (dollars) (dollars) (mllla)
1935 2,275 13,623 28.8
1936 -2.275 16,510 37.5
1937 -2,275 17,060 37.9
1938 -2,275 17,688 38.1
1939 -2,275 18,319 36.0
1940 -2,275 19,905 33.3
1941 12,500 22,663 33.9
1942** 10,575 11,672 14.5
1943 15,425 12,932 14.
5
1944 10,000 13,621 15.1
1945 -15,000 14,488 15.2
1940 25,129 26.0
1947 21,698 26,838 25.0
1958 26,597 21.0
1949 8.0OU 27,362 18.5
19 50 42,966 28,493 17.8
1951 42,521 30,511 17.3
1952 50,000 46,590 22.1
1953 63.0UO 48,121 21.0
1954 75,000 48,952 21.9
1955 120,000 50,115 21.6
195b 120,000 28,511 12.0
19 57 120,000 43,925 17.7
195S 90,000 45,815 19.0
1959 80,000 47,799 19.2
1960 86,000 30,934 8.7
1961 90,000 37,831 10.3
1962 80,000 29,719 7.7
1963 79,000 29,779 7.7
1964 79,000
1965 92,000
1966 108,327
1967 121,600
1968 80,000
Sa per $1,000
51.40
1.50
1.39
1.35
1.35
1.25
1.20
1.03
1.95
2.49
2.03
2.15
2.29
2.98
2.58 eat
'Calendar year prior to 1942; flecal year ending in year indi-
cated thereafter.
**Fir9t six taontha.
#Plua approximately $30,000 lntereat on aecurltlea owned by the
railroad.
Source: City ot Prlnavllle annual budgeta.
1969 95,000 28,779
1970 115,000 32,665
1971 115,000 34,646
19 72 127,873 37,365
1973 150,000 39,739
1974 105,000 42.259
1975 150,000 47.185
1976 150,000 50,005
1977 150,000 99,754
1978 100,000 151,265
1979 75,000 137,101
1980 75,000 181,738
1981 41,9980 211,575
1982 52,253* 283,588
1983 42,4041 255,981
total 3,273,140 2,361,041
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but there was strong desira on the part of the city to obtain as much
as possible.
While there was obvious merit in the sharing of the profits with
the city, two difficulties ultimately became apparent. First, in
retrospect, it is apparent that the railroad track maintenance was
inadequate; certainly after 1973, and perhaps to some extent before
that, the annual maintenance expenditures were not adequate to keep
the track in good condition. Thus the railroad was showing a profit
in excess of the actual earnings, taking track deterioration into con-
sideration. The problem became very obvious in the late seventies,
leading to the obtaining of a Federal grant for rehabilitation—
a
grant that should never have been necessary.
The second problem was that the city became so heavily dependent
upon railway revenues that adjustment to a lower figure was very diffi-
cult. The crisis arose in 1977, when the railroad indicated that it
could not contribute more than $50,000. This greatly aggravated the
city deficit; the city insisted on $25,000 additional but the following
year the figure had to go down to $50,000. The problem is that the
budget and property levy must be approved by the voters if the increase
exceeds 6%—and, particularly with the coming of the recession in the
lumber industry, voters have been reluctant to approve the increases
—
even though the rate is much lower than in neighboring cities. Oregon
voters are more and more demonstrating the anti-tax sentiment that has
swept the country. The 1977-78 budget discussion in the city council
This danger was pointed out to me by the city administrator in
1974.
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led Co a clash over the operation of the railway, the high wages and
salaries compared to those of the city, the extent to which funds were
retained, and the like. Some members stressed the importance of not
draining too much money from the railway, but the critics of the line
felt that drastic steps should be taken—and some mentioned possible
sale of the line.
As part of the terras of the Federal rehabilitation grant noted
subsequently, the railway was prohibited from transferring funds to
the city until the benefits from the rehabilitation exceeded the costs,
except for payment for services. These were calculated to be about
$42,000 in the 1982-83 fiscal year, primarily for police protection
and general administration. But the city was very anxious to get the
total contribution back to about $75,000 and so the earnings of a
portion of the railway's securities was allocated to the city—totaling
around $30,000 depending upon interest rates.
The total figures given above of course are not adjusted for infla-
tion, nor do they take into consideration the timing of city expendi-
tures and revenues. But if the original city contributions are included
and adjustments are made for the timing of these at assumed interest
rates, the city has gained, from the beginning of the railway, at least
$1 million net.
Freight Cars
The railway has never owned its own freight cars for commercial use;
various earlier suggestions to do so were rejected because of mainten-
ance and repair questions. Nor did the railroad normally suffer from a
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car shortage, partly because it had two connecting roads providing box-
cars. It also received some inbound cars with rough lumber, though
most of these were Southern Pacific cars which it could not load for
shipments east. In the early and mid seventies, there developed,
nationwide, serious freight car shortages. These, in turn, led the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to institute incentive per diem
rates, which encouraged the development of car leasing firms. These
firms had new cars built and developed arrangements with small rail-
roads not normally owning cars to lease them, the per diem paid by the
railroads actually using the cars being shared by the leasing firm and
the railroad owner. With many small lines, there was no intention that
the cars be used on the line at all—the aim was to keep them circulat-
ing and yielding rental.
The C of P was approached by representatives of SSI Rail Corpora-
tion, later part of ITEL, a San Francisco based conglomerate. After
extended negotiations, an agreement was reached in 1977 whereby the
railroad entered into a lease agreement for 200 boxcars, XM, 50'6"
cars, 9'1" width, suitable for lumber loading. No payment was required
of the railroad, but it would share in the revenues. The lease was for
15 years, with an option to extend for 5 more; at the end the cars
would be returned to SSI and the City of Prineville markings removed.
The first 15 cars arrived in July of 1977. There were several attrac-
tions to the city and the C of P:
1. Increased car availability. In 1977 and early in 1978 the road
suffered from a serious shortage of cars to provide the shippers, as a
nationwide shortage became acute, partly resulting from bad weather,
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partly from a peaking of grain shipments, which pulled cars from lumber
service. The C of P estimated that it was losing 35 to 50 percent of
its revenue in that year (1977-78)—with serious inconvenience to the
mills, which had to delay rail orders and also turned to trucks in
substantial measure. With this shortage, the railways agreed to take
200 more cars in 1978; it actually ended up with 397 in total.
2. Lessened car hire costs. It was estimated that the city would
save from $35,000 to $50,000 a year in reduced net per diem costs
through the leasing of these cars.
3. Substantial net earnings. So long as the cars were fully
utilized, the railway could net over $100,000 annually. This was the
period in which railway earnings were commencing to fall, and the
mayor was reported in the Central Oregonian , March 28, 1979, as saying:
"If we don't get money somewhere, we aren't going to have a railroad."
Initially, the railroad did earn a profit from the arrangement.
One estimate for 1978 was $95,000; my estimate for the year was $86,000.
For the following year my estimate was $133,000. The cars also con-
tributed a certain prestige value to the city and the railroad. The
only initial unfavorable reaction was from the UP and the BN, which
were hostile to the arrangement because it would lessen the earnings
from their own freight cars and increase their payment to the C of P.
Accordingly they cut off the free car hire time the C of P had always
enjoyed. But this was only the beginning of the problems. The sharp
increase in the number of box cars, the increased trend away from
standard boxcars nationally, and the recession quickly converted the
box car shortage into a great surplus. It is estimated that in mid
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1982 there are 250,000 idle boxcars in the northwest alone. The rental
earnings fell to $53,000 in 1980, and $28,000 in 1981. But more ser-
iously, the cars came home to roost. There was no way the C of P
could store all of the cars. About 200 went on to the McCloud River
Railroad in Northern California, an ITEL subsidiary. ITEL, itself in
bankruptcy, sued the C of P for costs of repainting, but ultimately
dropped the suit, and took back about 250 of the cars, some of which
went to the Seattle and North Coast, others to eastern roads. The
C of P, as of May 18, 1982, had 147 of the cars—only about 50 of which
are typically in use loaded with lumber and returning empty. The other
100 fill the sidings; they are a great nuisance, as they interfere
with normal operations and increase switching costs. The BN and the
UP did ultimately restore the free car hire period.
On the whole, while the railroad made some money on the deal, there
is widespread feeling that the proposal was misrepresented—that some-
thing was put over on the city. The main problem was of course the end
of the shortage—which in turn led the ICC to eliminate incentive per
diem in 1981, making the leasing operations still less profitable.
Another problem is that the standard boxcar is becoming less and
less suitable for use. In Prineville, American Forest Products, prob-
ably the largest shipper, has 51 special cars with moveable bulkheads
owned by Evans and assigned to it; these are labelled Amador Central,
a railroad subsidiary of AFP in California. They are much more satis-
factory for millwork shipments than standard cars.
Some of the shippers prefer to use Thrall door cars; there are
essentially three doors on each side rather than two, two of which can
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be open at once. This greatly facilitates unitized loading. The rail-
roads generally are not happy with them, regarding them as somewhat
dangerous. Some Minneapolis Northfield and Southern Thrall door cars
are available to Prineville shippers on an assigned basis. Otherwise,
the road provides C of P-leased cars as much as possible, and the two
major roads tolerate this, though they are not happy with it.
For chip loading, the C of P has assigned to it a group of Ashley
Drew and Northern cars, which are preferred by the shippers because
of heavier loading—35 and sometimes 38 units—than most BN and UP
cars. The only problem with the AD and N cars is that when fully
loaded and wet, they have created some operational problems for the
railroad. AD and N is owned by Georgia-Pacific Lumber Co.
Thus a decade ago, the freight cars on the line were primarily
cars of the Union Pacific and the predecessors of the Burlington
Northern; now few of these cars appear.
Piggy Back Operation
Until very recent years, the railroad management had not seriously
considered piggyback traffic, feeling that the potential volume was
too limited to warrant the expense. The impetus came from Schwab, much
interested in the use of piggyback, partly because the plant is not
located on a rail siding, partly because of the greater speed in
delivery—from Memphis, a major source of supply, 7 to 10 days, vs. 20
to 21 by boxcar. The company tried for four years to get piggyback
established, the railroad not initially being too enthusiastic, and
then, apparently asking for an excessive share of the through rate.
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Finally in 1981, an agreement was reached with the Burlington Northern
for acceptable rates and rate division, and the railroad then built
the ramp, which it was not willing to do until the rate was established.
Already, a substantial portion of the tires is coming in by piggyback.
The possibility of shipping millwork and lumber by piggyback re-
sulted in the establishment of outbound rates (in general piggyback
rates are not related to the type of commodity handled). Some ship-
ments are now going out in this fashion from American Forest Products.
Other shippers, however, are not happy with the type of van available
from the inbound tire traffic, because of loading, unloading, and
cargo shifting problems. Some interest has been expressed in use of
flatbed trucks in piggyback operation, as occurs in other parts of the
country.
Under a recent agreement, Prineville has been established as the
piggyback hub for central Oregon; piggyback loads to or from Bend,
Redmond, and Madras will be unloaded or loaded in Prineville and de-
livered by C of P personnel. The other roads are apparently willing
to do this to free themselves of the nuisance involved.
Management
In 64 years of operation, the road has had eight managers, but two
of them served a total of 44 years. The first manager, E. J. Wilson,
had railroad experience; the second had not, being resident engineer
for the state highway department in Prineville. He kept the railroad
together during the bad years, but was replaced by the City Council
in 1945. For the first time an outsider, C. C. McGlenn, was brought
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in. He was a civil engineering graduate, with long experience with
Great Northern branch lines. He was a highly successful manager, and
built the railroad into an efficient and prosperous operation. After
he retired in 1967, problems began. 0. E. Wilson, the longtime auditor
of the road, was made manager, but problems, apparently conflicts with
the city council, arose and he left to become manager of the Klamath
Northern, a position he still holds. Next, Merlin Nikolaus was brought
from the Apache Railroad in Arizona, but the council became dissatis-
fied, and he was ousted in October, 1972, replaced in January, 1973 by
Reed Johnson, who had been manager of the Mt. Hood Railroad, a Union
Pacific subsidiary in Oregon. Johnson was faced with very serious and
continuing family illness problems. He retired in 1979; the council
asked for applications, received about 30 and selected Billy Wiggs
,
who had been an official of the Norfolk Southern (the original NS).
The general feeling on the part of shippers and the city is that Wiggs
has done a good job, in reducing costs as revenue declined, obtaining
Federal grants for rehabilitation, getting piggyback rates, and
cooperating with the shippers. Relations with employees are somewhat
less good.
The management problems the road has faced, except under McGlenn,
represent a basic difficulty for small railroads: where to find good
managers, as there is no particular training source. Employees of
major railroads typically have performed highly specialized work and
may not be well suited for overall management. Persons brought in from
the outside are not familiar with local conditions. The management of
a municipal line has a particularly difficult problem of maintaining
good relations with the city council. This may be much more trouble-
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sorae than relations with the board of directors of a private firm.
The councils, over the years, have not hesitated to oust managers whom
they felt were not doing an adequate job.
Employees
Currently there are 16 employees, as follows:
Track, including rehabilitation work 6
Shop 2
Train crew 3
Office 4
Manager 1
By contrast, there were 23, including the manager, in 1973, at the peak
of operation.. The number of track and shop employees was the same
(there was a part-time helper in the shop in 1973, not included in the
total); but the office staff, exclusive of the manager, had five. The
large reduction was in train crew members; there were 9, as there were
two crews, four men in one, five in the other. The line now operates
with one three-man crew. Since the same crew does the switching and
line haul, three persons are imperative even at present traffic levels.
Initially the employees were nonunion, and were paid on a monthly
basis. In 1940 the crew members were organized by the Railroad Brother-
hoods, and later the maintenance, shop, and office workers all joined
unions in their fields. There was one strike by the shop employees in
1974. Standard wage scales are paid. The figures are shown in Table 6.
The wages of hourly-basis employees are converted to an annual basis by
multiplying the hourly rate by 40 x 52, and do not indicate the actual
annual earnings, which are affected by hours actually worked, overtime,
etc. The actual figures cannot be released.
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TABLE 6
Relative Wages of City and Railway Employees
City Annual Railroad Annual
Job Pay Range
(?)
Job
Monthly basis:
Pay Range
(?)
City Administrator 25,992 Auditor 29,340
Senior accounting Agent 29,340
clerk 15,240
Chief of Police 23,724 Chief clerk 21,492
Patrol Officer 13,020-16 ,800 Roundhouse foreman 28,116
Corrections officer 13,0 20-16
;
,800 Hourly basis :
Fire Chief 19,800 Conductor 26,645
Park Supervisor 15,600 Engineer 28,101
Street Superintendent 21,600 Brakeman 24,357
Mechanic 14,352 Section foreman 26,395
Sewer Superintendent 18,000 Laborer 20,155
Typist 8,400-10,500 Welder 23,421
Machinist 24,502
Hourly wage rate converted to 40 hour week, 52 weeks. Actual pay
may vary substantially because of overtime, and of inability to work
full time.
Sources: City of Prineville Budget, 1982-83; railroad standard
wage scale.
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Table 6 also indicates the salaries of city employees, for purposes
of comparison, as shown by the 1982-83 budget. The railway employees,
in general are paid substantially better, for similar work, than those
of the city. This is a long standing source of complaint in Prineville,
particularly by the city council and shippers, and would make it very
difficult to get the council and the voters to approve a subsidy for
the railroad if it failed to cover expenses.
In addition to the relatively high (compared to city employees)
wages, unionization by type of work significantly reduces the variety
of tasks a particular employee can perform. Most small railroads are
not unionized, and have maximum flexibility in the use of labor. The
problem is aggravated in 1982 by the fact that the city employee unions
have agreed to a wage freeze, whereas the railroad employees are
scheduled for a 9% increase under national labor contracts. The manager
is seeking to avoid this increase.
With a small line, particularly if traffic falls substantially be-
low present levels, it is imperative that individual workers be free
to perform a variety of tasks. On some small lines, train crew—often
only two—will do track work or equipment repair in the hours they are
not operating the train. This type of adjustment may become imperative
for the C of P.
The Proposal to Buy the Railroad
Possible sale of the railroad has been mentioned at times over the
years; the question came up when the city council was discussing the
decline in railroad contributions to the city in 1977. In August,
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1981, Che railway manager proposed that the employees buy the railroad
from the city for the price of $2 million. The proposal, specifically,
was for a 5 year lease with option to buy. His argument was essen-
tially that the employees could operate the line more efficiently if
they owned it—an argument that did not find favor with many persons,
as it suggested current inefficiency. The manager planned to put up
some funds, but most were expected to come from the federal rail assis-
tance and other federal programs. The employees on the whole were
initially sympathetic, but not so when they learned that the manager
would hold 51% of the stock, and some felt that primarily the objective
of the manager was to eliminate the unions.
The city government was favorably inclined toward the proposal;
the city would obtain $2 million—which, at 10%, would yield $200,000
a year, covering two-thirds or more of city expenditure now financed
from property tax and three times as much as is now being derived from
the railway. Several major shippers, however, were strongly opposed,
fearing that private ownership might ultimately result in abandonment
of the line. There was also some skepticism about the $2 million
becoming available. In any event, the manager dropped the plan when
shippers objected. All in all, it was a little too good to be true.
Transfer to private ownership would of course make the line subject to
property and income tax.
The opposition was clearly expressed in a letter by Don Miller,
President of Schwab, that appeared in the Central Oregonian , October 8,
1981.
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The Federal Rehabilitation Grants
As late as 1968 the track was maintained in good condition. By
the early seventies, however, track conditions began to slip; the rela-
tively low figure of tie replacement of 100 a year in the period gave
some indication. By the end of the seventies the track was typically
in bad condition, the problem aggravated by the increase in the weight
of the loaded chip cars. In the last five years, there were two serious
derailments (December 1977, February 1982) in which cars were turned
over, and 15 minor ones. Not only were about half the ties defective
by the late seventies, but much of the rail was too light (some the
original 75 pound rail) for modern heavy cars. The track problem was
compounded by the use of lava cinder ballast, which is cheap in central
Oregon but absorbs water and allows the rails to get out of alignment.
The basic problem was that inadequate funds had been allocated for track
improvement over a decade. The track met Federal Class 1 standards,
allowing 10 mph operation, but nothing more.
One of the first actions Wiggs took was to seek Federal funds for
rehabilitation, as provided under the 4R and the Rail Services Assis-
tance Acts. The funds were available through the states; each state
had a minimum sum, and since Oregon had very little mileage requiring
rehabilitation (the Southern Pacific as a matter of policy generally
avoided applying for funds) , the C of P was able to obtain state ap-
proval for the assistance. Three grants have been obtained: $850,000
in 1980, now fully used; $509,000 in 1981, and $350,000 in 1982. Work
was commenced at the juntion. Ties have been replaced (between 15,000
and 20,000), and old rails replaced by 100, 110, and 112 pound rails,
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inost from Che Milwaukee main line. The relay rail has cost $195 a ton,
a relatively good figure. Rock ballast has replaced the lava cinder
ballast. About half of the line will have rebuilt by October, 1982 and
additional amounts from the third grant. Some additional funds are
required, however, to complete the rehabilitation, and the manager is
seeking these funds. When completed, the track will reach Class II
(25 mph) standards, and the manager would like to get to the level of
35 mph. Additional speed, would, of course, have little effect upon
cost.
Conclusions
The experience of the City of Prineville Railroad offers several
conclusions, both for small-railroad operation and for municipal oper-
ation of railroad lines.
Small Railroad Operations. Detailed examination of the experience
of the railway indicates the evolution, strengths and the problems of
small railroads with relatively light traffic density. The C of P
has in recent decades had far more traffic than many small railroads
and branch lines but far less than the typical main line. The road
provides a prototype of shifting traffic patterns over six decades.
1. A small local line could operate with marginal profit serving
a small community dependent on the livestock industry before
the coming of the motor vehicle.
2. Livestock traffic, plus inbound LCL merchandise traffic, was
the type most vulnerable to truck competition. Most was lost
by the 1930s and virtually all by the early fifties. A rail-
road serving a livestock producing area, without other sig-
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nificant traffic, could not survive once trucking developed.
There are many other examples throughout the country.
3. Other farm product traffic lasted a longer time, the potato
traffic to the 1970s, but then has largely been taken over by
trucks.
4. Lumber traffic remained almost completely with the railroad
till the raid 1970s; in the last five years, truck competition
has increased substantially, more so on lumber than on mill-
work. Wood chip traffic has remained on rail, but is threatened
by a truck-barge combination.
5. Inbound carload manufactured goods traffic slowly eroded until
very little was left, until the rapid growth of a tire whole-
sale firm in Prineville. Inbound traffic for this firm has
become a major source of revenue. This development was
fortuitous—the product of the initiative of a local resident.
6. With a traffic volume of 330 to 550 cars originated or termi-
nated per mile, and ton miles per mile ranging from 280,000
to 380,000 per year, the road did well financially, earning
an adequate return on investment, with the rate divisions the
major roads were willing to provide. These rate divisions
gave the railway a percentage disproportionate to the mileage,
which was essential, given the performance of the switching
and billing functions by the C of P. The cost per ton mile,
in the peak traffic years, around 4 cents, was certainly a
reasonable figure.
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7. With a sharp drop in traffic in the last three years the road
has been able to reduce costs but not proportionate to the
traffic decline, and thus profits have vanished. This drop is
largely a product of the depression in the lumber industry.
8. The Staggers Act, while giving the railroads as a whole much
more rate freedom, is causing great concern for the C of P
and its shippers, as with short lines elsewhere, because of
a tendency of the major roads to eliminate some joint rates.
9. Despite the development of trucking, the shippers regard con-
tinuation of the railroad as of utmost importance to the
economic health and development of the community.
10. There are special problems in the selection of a manager for
a small railroad; there is essentially no "training school".
11. The fact that the railroad connects with both of the major
rail systems serving the northwest is of great importance to
it and its shippers.
Municipal Operations . There has been relatively little experience
with municipal operation of railways in the U.S., and thus the exper-
ience of Prineville is particularly significant:
1. The building of the railway by the city, when private enter-
prise would not do it, was of tremendous importance to the
economic development of the community; without it the lumber
mills would have located on the main line and Prineville would
never have developed. There is very substantial evidence of
this effect.
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2. The railway as a private firm probably could not have sur-
vived the losses of the 1930s.
3. Financially the city has done very well by its investment, the
railroad having been a major source of city revenue over a
long period.
4. On the whole the railway has operated with a high degree of
efficiency; municipal operation does not involve inherent
inefficiency.
5. The relationships between the city and the railroad have always
been somewhat ambiguous. On the whole, however, the city has
tried only to control general policy and leave day to day
operating decisions to the manager.
6. Without question, the city, over the years, drained too much
money from the railroad, resulting in inadequate track mainten-
ance.
7. The experience shows the clear danger of a city relying on
railroad profits for a large portion of the current operating
budget; as the profits ended, the city has had a difficult
time recouping the revenue from property taxes, especially in
a period such as the present of severe depression (the unem-
ployment rate in Crook County is 24% as of mid 1982) and
general anti-tax sentiment.
8. The task of the manager of a city operated railroad is prob-
ably more difficult than that of one of a private firm, in view
of the need to maintain good relations with the city council.
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If traffic continues to fall, the railway and the city will be
faced with a difficult task of reducing costs, made more difficult by
the unionization of the employees and the payment of the national
railroad wage scale. One consequence of the strong unionization has
been to bring the earnings of railway employees well above those of
city employees in jobs with similar skills. Narrowing of this gap and
increased flexibility in the use of labor will be imperative, par-
ticularly if the point is reached at which city financial assistance
would be required.
In the foreseeable future, given the ability to reduce costs, there
is no danger of need to abandon the line; the traffic volume is still
far above that of many small railroads and branch lines of major
systems that are economically viable. But profitable operation will
require substantial traffic increase.
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